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1. INTRODUCTION 
On February 8, 1996, the tortoise offederal law finally caught up with 
the hare of communications technology. After more than a half-century of 
broadcast regulation under the Communications Act of 1934,1 a dozen 
years of tinkering with cable television,2 and more than a decade of 
telephone supervision by Judge Greene,3 Congress passed, and President 
Clinton signed, the Telecommunications Act of 1996.4 
This law represents a vision of a telecommunications marketplace 
where the flexibility and innovation of competition replaces the heavy hand 
of regulation. It is based on the premise that technological changes will 
permit a flourishing of telecommunications carriers, engaged in head-to-
head competition, resulting in a multitude of communications carriers and 
programmers being made available to the American consumer. 
Ironically, it is the convergence of technology that is to lead to a 
diverse telecommunications marketplace.s If the same physical plant can 
. I. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. I 064 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
2. See, e.g., Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 
2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559); Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (some sections codified 
throughout 47 U.S. C.; other sections uncodified). In this Article, I will refer to "the Cable 
Act" to refer to cable law at the time the 1996 Telecommunications was passed. I will refer 
to the "1984 Cable Act" or the "1992 Cable Act" to reference particular sections from those 
laws. 
3. Judge Harold Greene oversaw the break-up of the AT&T, beginning with approval 
of an antitrust settlement in United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 13 I (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd 
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) and numerous decisions that 
followed. 
4. Telecommunications Act ofI996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified 
at scattered sections of 47 U.S. C.). Unfortunately for lawyers and judges trying to discuss 
this Act, there is no uniform way to refer to all the sections. Some are codified, some are 
not. For ease of reference, the following convention will be used: When a provision is 
codified, it will be referred to by both its section number within the Act itself as well as by 
its U.S.C. section; uncodified sections will be referred to by their particular section number 
within the Act itsel£ 
The most important legislative history for the 1996 Act is the report that was issued by 
the House-Senate Conference which reported the final version of the bill, Joint Explanatory 
Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458 (1996). 
5. One definition of convergence is "the combination of both new and existing 
media-e.g., broadcasting, cable, fiber optics, satellites-into one integrated system for 
delivery of video, voice, and data." Michael H. Botein, Antitrust Issues in the Telecommu-
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offer local and long-distance telephone service, provide cable television 
programming, and carry voice, data, and video signals, then competing 
systems offering the whole package, as well as selected sub-parts, can 
replace localized monopolies. 
There is no guarantee, however, that true competition will flourish, 
and it is certainly possible that unregulated fiefdoms will soon dot the 
electronic landscape. The 1996 Act is an experiment, as, one would have 
to admit, all telecommunications regulation is an experiment.6 
Whether or not the devil is in the details, the future of telecommuni-
cations regulation can only be appreciated with, at least, a preliminary 
understanding of the specific details of the Act.7 This Article represents an 
effort to provide a guided tour through the major provisions of the 1996 
Act. 
Section II describes the new regime for telecommunications in general, 
and telephone in particular. Section m describes the newest cable 
regulation, while Section IV details the changes in broadcast regulation. 
Section V describes the major attempt to regulate content, rather than 
conduit, in the 1996 Act. 
II. FROM TELEPHONE TO TELEC01v1MUNICATIONS 
The goal of Congress was to create a legislative change as dramatic 
as the evolution of the old-fashioned telephone, canying voices over distant 
wires, into telecommunications, the transmission of "information," including 
data and video, as well as aural communications.s Accordingly, Congress 
decided that the monopolistic local telephone company must be forced to 
share its market, while at the same time, be permitted into both the free 
wheeling competitive world of long-distance service and the potentially 
competitive video market as well. In the words of the FCC: "In the old 
regulatory regime, government encouraged monopolies. In the new 
regulatory regime, we and the states remove the outdated barriers that 
protect monopolies from competition and affirmatively promote efficient 
competition using tools forged by Congress.,,9 
nications and Software Industries, 25 Sw. U.L. REv. 569, 569 (1996). 
6. Cj. Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919.) (Holmes, J. dissenting) (describing 
the theory of free speech by stating, "It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment."). 
7. Those struggling to attain this understanding, may well feel new sympathy for the 
sentiments of Henry David Thoreau: "Our life is frittered away by detail •••• Simplify, 
simplify." Henry David Thoreau, Walden. 
8. See Telecommuncations Act, sec. 3, § 153(48), 110 Stat. at 60 (to be codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 153(48». 
9. In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, Part II, Order, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,476, 45,479 (1996) [hereinafter 
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The most difficult piece in the deregulatory puzzle is how to create 
competition for local telephone service. Telephone (in fact all telecommu-
nications) service is generally divided between local and long-distance 
service. Current technology has created a peculiar reality where it is far 
easier to carry information thousands of miles across the country than the 
last mile into a recipient's business or home. It is the market for that last 
mile, so to speak, which must be competitive for the 1996 Act to achieve 
its far-reaching goals. 
The geographical dividing line for a local telephone region is termed 
a "Local Access and Transport Area," or "LJUA".10 A company that 
offers long distance service is said to be offering ''1nterLATA Service," 
meaning the communication is between points not within the same local 
area. 11 
Following the break-up of AT&T in 1982, long-distance, or inter-
LJUA, telephone service became a highly competitive market, with both 
large and small players. 12 The local telephone market was initially divided 
among seven Bell Operating Companies (BOCS),13 known colloquially as 
"Baby Bells." But these "babies" were not only large, they c~mtinued to 
enjoy virtually monopoly control over their area's local telephone service. 
There were numerous much smaller local telephone companies, that had 
monopolies over rural or much smaller geographic areas. 
The expense of duplicating the local phone company's infrastructure, 
and the necessity of interconnecting with its plant, also made it obvious that 
competition for the local market would be impossible without the active 
assistance of the very companies with whom competition was sought. The 
question for lawmakers was how local telephone service, long considered 
a "natural monopoly,"14 could be opened for competition. 
Implementation Order. Part Il]. 
10. Telecommunications Act, sec. 3, § 153(43), 110 Stat. at 59 (to be codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 153(43». A LATA is a contiguous region, encompassing no more than one 
metropolitan statistical area. The area can be greater ifpennitted under the AT&T Consent 
Decree or by the FCC. Id. 
11. Id., sec. 3, § 153(42), 110 Stat at 59 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(42». 
12. The three largest companies, AT&T, Sprint, MCI, are joined by hundreds of smaller 
long-distance companies. See generally Debra Kay Thomas Graves, The Consumer 
Protection Myth in Long-Distance Telephone Regulation: Remed{esfor the "Caveat Dialer" 
Attitude. 27 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 383, 391 (1996). 
13. Telecommunications Act, sec. 3, § 153(35), 110 Stat. at 58 (to be codified at 47 
V.S.C. § 153(35». 
14. "The incumbent LEes have economies of density, connectivity, and scale; 
traditionally, these have been viewed as creating a natural monopoly." ImplementationOrder, 
Part II 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,481. See generally Lawrence Sullivan, Elusive Goals Under the 
TelecommunicationsAct, 25 Sw. U.L. REv. 487, 494-507 (1996). 
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New Part II of Communications Act, entitled "Development of 
Competitive Markets," creates the blueprint for what Congress hoped would 
become the future of telecommunications. IS Section 251 details the 
substantive framework necessary for achieving competition in telecommu-
nications and section 252 describes the procedural mechanism for 
implementing that framework.16 
A. The Duties of Competitors 
Congress divided telecommunication carriers into four classifications 
and varied the degree of regulation with each category. The broadest group 
is the general telecommunications carrier, then comes the subgroup called 
Local Exchange Carriers (LECs), which is further subdivided into 
"incumbent" Local Exchange Carriers, and finally, the most detailed 
regulatory provisions are for the BOCS.17 
A "telecommunications carrier" is defined as any entity offering, for 
a fee to the public, to transmit information without changing the content of 
that which is transmitted. IS The primary duty imposed on all telecom-
munications carriers is interconnection. In other words, all telecommunica-
tion carriers must connect directly or indirectly with other carriers. 19 
Additionally, carriers are prohibited from designing their networks so as to 
thwart the ability of other carriers from interconnecting with them.20 
Far more detailed requirements are imposed on the LECs-those who 
provide either telephone exchange service or service access?1 Genuine 
competition in local phone service was recognized as being very difficult 
to acheive, yet was regarded as essential if there were to be true telecom-
munications competition. Despite the initial situation of general monopoly 
LEC status, the 1996 Act described five obligations to be shouldered by all 
future LECs, both dominant and challenger. 
The first of these obligations involves resale.22 LECs are barred from 
either prohibiting or imposing discriminatory or unreasonable conditions on 
the resale of telecommunications services. 
15. Telecommunications Act, sec. 101, 110 Stat. at 61. 
16. Id sec. 101, §§ 251-252, 110 Stat. at 61-70 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-
252). 
17. Id secs. 101, § 251, sec. 151, § 271, 110 Stat. at 61-62,86-92 (to be codified at 47 
U.S.C. §§ 251-271). 
18. Id sec. 3, § 153(49)-(51), 110 Stat. at 60 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(49)-
(51». 
19. Id sec. 101, § 251(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 61 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(I». 
20. Id sec. 101, § 251(a)(2), 110 Stat. at 62 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(2». 
21. Id sec. 3, § 153(44), 110 Stat. at 59 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(44». 
22. Id sec. 101, § 251(b)(I), 110 Stat. at 62 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(I». 
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Next, all LECs must provide "number portability.))23 This will permit 
users to switch from one telecommunications carrier to another without 
having to change their existing telecommunications numbers.24 The Act 
recognizes the potential difficulty in implementing this mandate, so it 
provides that number portability will be required only "to the extent 
technically feasible," and in accordance with FCC requirements.2S 
Additionally, the Act states that the FCC must ensure that the costs of 
establishing number portability are "borne by all telecommunications 
carriers on a competitively neutral basis."26 
The third requirement for all LECs is that they provide dialing 
parity.27 The term "dialing parity" is defined to mean that customers would 
dial the same number of digits to use any available telecommunications 
provider.28 
Next, all LECs must provide their competitors with access to their 
poles, conduits, and other rights-of-way.29 Congress first protected the 
rights of cable operators to use telephone poles in the Pole Attachment Act 
of 1978.30 Under the 1996 Act, access to poles will be even easier. In 
addition to requiring LECs to share their poles, the Act requires utilities,31 
such as gas and electric companies, to provide access on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis to cable operators and other telecommunications carriers.32 
The final obligation imposed on all LECs is that they establish 
"reciprocal compensation arrangements.,,33 Such arrangements provide that 
a network in which a call originates compensates the network in which that 
23. Id. sec. 3, § 251(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 62 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2)). 
24. Id. sec. 3, § 153(46), 110 Stat. at 60 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(46)). 
25. Id. sec. 101, § 251(b)(2), llO Stat. at 62 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2)). 
For the FCC's regulations, see 47 C.F.R. §§ 52.21-.3l. 
26. Id. sec. 101, § 251(e)(2), 110 Stat. at 64 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(e)(2)). 
27. Id. sec. 101, § 251(3), 110 Stat. at 59 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(3)). 
28. Id. sec. 3, § 153(39), 110 Stat. at 59 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(39)). See 
generaliy47 C.F.R. §§ 51.205-.215. 
29. Id. sec. 101, § 251(b)(4), 110 Stat. at 62 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(4)). 
30. Communications Act Amendments of1978, Pub. L. No. 95-234, 92 Stat. 33, 35-36. 
31. Telecommunications Act, sec. 703, 110 Stat. at 149-50 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 224(a)(I)). 
32. Id. sec. 703, 110 Stat at ISO. Such access may be denied ifthere is insufficient pole 
capacity or problems with safety or reliability. Id. sec. 703, 110 Stat. at 150. By 1998, the 
FCC must devise a means for resolving disputes over the rates charged for this pole 
attachment, to be phased in over a five-year period. Id. sec. 703, 1 10 Stat. at 150. For now, 
cable operators using the poles of others, can continue to rely on the rate formula used prior 
to the 1996 Act. Id. sec. 703, 110 Stat. at 150. The new FCC regulations, when they do 
become effective, will apply to all telecommunications carriers, except for cable television 
systems providing only cable service. Id. 
33. Id. sec. 101, § 25I(b)(5), 110 stat. at 62 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5)). 
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call tenninates. For simplicity and efficiency, the Act pennits arrangements 
such as the so-called "bill-and-keep" arrangement, whereby two networks 
agree to waive their rights to recover from one another under this 
section.34 
Congress was well aware that existing LECs would have an enonnous 
potential advantage over potential competitors in the local market. 
Accordingly, several additional restrictions were placed on "incumbent" 
LECs, those either providing telephone exchange service on the enactment 
date of the Act (February 8, 1996) or those newcomers detennined by the 
FCC to have obtained a market position comparable to that of an incum-
bent.3s 
In addition to the requirements imposed on all LECs, incumbent LECs 
must provide interconnection for other telecommunication carriers at "any 
technically feasible point" in the incumbent's network.36 This means that 
interconnection must be provided for all competitors who wish to provide 
local telephone exchange service and exchange access. There is no similar 
requirement that an incumbent LEC pennit interconnection by a cable 
television operator or other sort of infonnation service, except to the extent 
that they are providers of telecommunications service. All interconnection 
under this provision must be, at least, of the same quality as that available 
for either the incumbent LEC itself or its affiliates, and must be made 
available at reasonable and nondiscriminatory rates and tenns. 
Incumbent LECs are also required to make available to competing 
telecommunications carriers "unbundled access" to "network elements."37 
A "network element" is defined to include not only the physical equipment 
used to provide telecommunications service, but also significant functions, 
systems, and infonnation that are made available by, or are used in the 
34. Id sec. 101, § 252(d)(2)(B)(i), IIO Stat. at 68 (to be codified as 47 U.S.C 
§ 252(d)(2)(B)(i». 
35. Id sec. 101, § 251(h), 110 Stat. at 65 (to be codified as 47 U.S.C. § 251 (h». As the 
FCC stated, "The rules we adopt ••• will benefit consumers by making some of the 
strongest aspects of local exchange carrier incumbency-the local dialing, telephone 
numbers, operator services, directory assistance, and directory listing-available to all 
competitors on an equal basis." In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions 
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Part III, Second Report and Order, 61 Fed. Reg. 
47,284, 47,287 (1996). 
36. Telecommunications Act, sec. 101, § 251(c)(2), IIO stat. at 62 (to be codified as 47 
U.S.C. § 25 I (c )(2». Accordingto the FCC, the term "interconnection" in this section "refers 
only to the physical linking of two networks for the mutual exchange of traffic." 
ImplementationOrder, Part II, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,476,45,500. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.305 for the 
FCC's regulations on interconnection. 
37. Id sec. 101, § 251(c)(3), IIO Stat. at 62-63 (to be codified as 47 U.S.C. 
§ 251(c)(3». See 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.307-.321 for the relevant FCC regulations. 
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transmission of, telecommunications service.38 These would include local 
loops and sub-loops, switching, and signaling functions. ''Unbundled access" 
means the availability of access to distinct parts of the incumbent's network, 
at an appropriately lower cost than access to all of the elements of the 
network. Thus, a competitor can purchase only those network components 
and functions that it needs to offer service. That competitor is then free to 
combine these unbundled elements in the manner its deems best for 
providing service. 
In order to make interconnection and unbundled access economically 
feasible, incumbent LEes are required to pennit physical collocation of 
their competitors' equipment.39 In other words, incumbent LEes must 
allow other telecommunication carriers to place their equipment at the site 
of the incumbent's own switching center. Again, rates charged for using 
these premises must be reasonable and nondiscriminatory. 
A different type of competition is made possible by the requirement 
that the incumbent LEe sell to other carriers, at wholesale rates, the same 
telecommunication service it provides to retail customers.40 The availabili-
ty of wholesale pricing will enable the other carriers to offer for sale the 
same service to the incumbent's customers.41 
The most contentious part of this issue is the detennination of 
wholesale rates. If the wholesale rates are too close to retail rates, it will 
discourage com,petition in the local market. 42 On the other hand, if 
wholesale rates are too low, it may discourage the construction of facilities-
based competition.43 
The 1996 Act states that ''wholesale'' rates are to be calculated by 
38. Id sec. 3, § 153(45), 110 Stat. at 59-60 (to be codified as 47 U.S.C. 153(45)). 
39. Id sec. 101, § 251(c)(6), 110 Stat. at 63 (to be codified as 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6)). 
If physical collocation is either technically impractical or impossible due to space limitations, 
the Act permits a state regulatory commission to authorize "virtual collocation" instead.Id 
See generally47 C.F.R. § 51.323 (1996). 
40. Telecommunications Act, sec. 101, § 251(c)(4)(A), 110 Stat. at 63 (to be codified 
at 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(A)). 
4 1. In keeping with this particular provision's goal of creating direct competition, only 
one limitation is placed on the resale oftelecommunications service: where a service has not 
been made universally available by the incumbent, but has only been available to a particular 
category of subscribers, a State commission can prohibit the resale of that service to a 
different category ofsubscribers.Id sec. 101, § 251(c)(4)(B), 110 Stat. at 63 (to be codified 
as 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(B)). 
42. See generally Implementation Order, Part II. supra note 9, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,475, 
45,563-67. The FCC stated that resale is an "important entry strategy for many new entrants, 
especially in the short term when they are building their own facilities," and also for "small 
businesses that may lack capital to compete in the local exchange market ..• by building 
their own networks." Id at 45,564. 
43. Id. at 45,565. 
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subtracting from retail subscriber rates any "costs that will be avoided by 
the local exchange carrier.,,44 Arithmetically, wholesale rates equal retail 
rates minus costs avoided. Even though the 1996 Act says that each "State 
commission" should determine the wholesale rates,4S the FCC has adopted 
a "minimum set of criteria for [the] avoided cost studies" that will be 
conducted by the states.46 
Most notably, the FCC ruled that the "avoided costs" are not to be 
limited to only the costs that an incumbent LEC will actually avoid by 
selling wholesale rather than directly to subscribers.47 If that were the case, 
the incumbent would have an incentive to keep its expenditures high, so 
that its competitors would pay a higher resale price. The FCC, instead, ruled 
that "avoided costs" means all of the costs "that an incumbent LEC would 
no longer incur if it were to cease retail operations and instead provide all 
of its services through resellers,'>48 whether these savings were actually 
realized or not. 
The FCC also decreed a default wholesale rate, one that is to be used 
by State commissions who either have not yet conducted an "avoided retail 
cost study" or choose not to undertake such a study.49 In either case, the 
FCC decreed that interim wholesale rates must be set at between 17 percent 
and 25 percent below the incumbent LECs retail rates.so 
B. The Special Case ofBOCs 
The strongest monopolists in the telecommunications universe are the 
Bell Operating Companies, the BOCs, who spun offfrom Kf&T and carved 
up the local telephone market. If a competitive telecommunications system 
is to evolve, the BOCs must face direct competition for local service. The 
BOCs, meanwhile, have long been champing at the bit to enter the long 
distance market. 
In a sense the most important piece of legislative strategy in the 1996 
Act was the provision that the Boes are to be given permission to offer 
long distance service to their local customers only upon fulfilling a 
44. Telecommunications Act, sec. 101, § 2S2(d)(3), 110 stat at 68 (to be codified as 47 
U.S.C. § 252(d)(3». 
45. Id. 
46. Implementation Order, Part II. 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,565. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.609 (1996). This avoided cost includes both the direct costs 
of providing retail service and a pro rata share of indirect costs, meaning costs like general 
corporate operating expenses that are shared between retail and wholesale operations. 47 
C.F.R. § 51.609(c) (1996). 
49. Implementation Order, Part II, 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,565. 
50. 47 C.F.R. § 51.611(b) (1996). 
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"competitive checklist" that ensures or pennits competition for local service. 
Because of the lack of a similar danger of unfair competition, BOCs are 
free to offer long-distance service to those not within their local service 
areas immediately.51 For a BOC to be given FCC pennission to offer Iong-
distance service to its own local clientele, though, there must be either: 1) 
an agreement with an existing competitor for that BOCs local service or, 2) 
if no competitor has come forward, a statement indicating that the BOC is 
ready to provide access and interconnection for potential competitors. 
Before the FCC will consider a BOCs request to provide long distance 
service to its local customers, the state commission with jurisdiction over 
that locality must give its approval to the agreement of statement. 
1. The Competitive Checklist 
The "competitive checklist" for BOCs wanting to offer long distance 
service includes many of the provisions required under the provisions 
governing general incumbent Local Exchange Companies.52 The Act, 
however, adds several requirements that are specific to telephone service. 
To gain pennission to enter the long distance market, a BOC must offer 
"access and interconnection" to others who wish to compete for the local 
market. "Access and interconnection". is defined to include all of the 
following: 
From the incumbent LEC checklist 
1. Interconnection for other carriers offering intraLATA service at "any 
technically feasible point" in the BOC's network 
2. Unbundled access to network elements 
From the general LEe checklist 
3. Access to BOC poles, conduits, and other rights-of-way. 
4. Number portability 
5. Dialing parity 
6. Reciprocal compensation arrangements 
7. Availability for resale 
Specific for BOCs Checklist 
8. Local loop transmission (from the central office to customer's premises) 
9. Local transport 
10. Local switching 
51. Telecommunications Act, sec. 151, § 271(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 86. Someservices,such 
as "800" services which terminate inside a BOC' s local area and permit subscribers to choose 
their long distance carriers, are considered in-region services subject to the competitive 
checklist requirement. Id sec. 151, § 2710), 110 Stat. at 92 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 2710». 
52. See supra Part II.A. 
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11. Nondiscriminatory access to emergency (911 and E911), directory 
assistance, and operator call-completion services 
12. White page directory listing for competitors' customers 
13. Nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers 
14. Nondiscriminatory access to data bases and signalling necessary for call 
routing and completion. 
2. Facilities-based Competitors for the Local Market 
The above checklist encompasses the minimum requirements to be 
contained in agreements with competitors for the local telephone market. In 
order to ensure that a powerful, independent competitor exists for local 
service prior to a BOC's entry into the long distance market, the Act 
requires that any competitor be "facilities-based." 53 The term "facilities-
based" means that the competitor is providing local service either exclusive-
ly or predominantly over its own facilities. It excludes a competitor who is 
merely reselling the BOC's telephone exchange service.54 The prime 
example given by Congress of an effective "two-wire" policy is the 
provision of competitive local telephone service through the facilities of a 
local cable television system.55 
Moreover, to ensure that local competition is in place, the competitor 
must be operational, not merely in the planning stage.56 This will also 
make it easier to ensure that the full checklist is in place. 
3. The Absence of Local Competitors 
It is, of course, possible that no one will want to take on a particular 
BOC on its home court. The drafters of the 1996 Act did not want to deny 
a BOC under those circumstances all opportunity to offer long-distance 
service to its local customers. Accordingly, the Act provides that a BOC 
who has not received a request for interconnection may still apply for 
permission to provide such long-distance service. Instead of an agreement, 
the BOC must file a statement of the terms and conditions under which it 
is ready and willing to offer the components of the competitive checklist. 
It was also foreseeable that, if a signed agreement was a necessary 
prerequisite for BOC entry into the long-distance market, some player in 
53. Telecommunications Act, sec. 151, § 271(c)(I)(A), 110 Stat. at 87 (to be codified 
at 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(I)(A». According to the Conference Report, this requirement is to 
ensure, "that an unaffiliated competing provider is in the market." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-
458, at 148. 
54. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 148. 
55. ld. 
56. ld. 
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that market might try to delay BOC entry by engaging in bad faith 
negotiation or otherwise acting improperly. To prevent such subterfuge, the 
statement described above will also suffice if the only providers to request 
access have failed to negotiate in good faith.57 
4. Separate Affiliates 
Even with the competitive checklist in place, Congress feared that a 
BOC could use its local power to leverage an unfair advantage over 
competitive markets. As an additional safeguard, the 1996 Act requires that 
a BOC create a separate affiliate if it wanted to offer certain services. 
First, a BOC must use a separate affiliate to offer its local customers 
long-distance service.58 These services include all long-distance telephone, 
telecommunications, or information services, other than "incidental" 
services,s9 and services that had been authorized prior to the 1996 Act.60 
Second, a separate affiliate is needed for BOCs engaged in manufac-
turing activities.61 The term "manufacturing" includes all the activities 
previously covered by that term in the AT&T Consent Decree.62 A BOC 
cannot discriminate in favor of its own affiliate in the procurement of 
manufacturing equipment. 63 
The separate affiliate must operate independently from its BOC 
parent.64 It must keep separate books and records and must have separate 
officers, directors and employees. Further, all transactions with the BOC 
must be "on an arm's length basis.,,6s 
57. Telecommunications Act, sec. 151, § 271(c)(I)(B), 110 Stat at 87 (to be codified 
at 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(B)). The statement will also suffice if the only providers to request 
access have failed to comply, in a timely fashion, with the implementation schedule of an 
interconnection agreement. Id. 
58. Id. sec. 1St, § 272(a)(2)(B), 110 Stat at 92 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 272(a)(2)(B)). 
59. Id. sec. 151, § 272(a)(2)(B)(i), 110 Stat at 92 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272 
(a)(2)(B)(i)). "Incidental services" are defined to include such services as: alarm monitoring 
services, audio and video programming and the capability of interaction for subscriber 
selection of such programming, commercial mobile services, and signaling information used 
in connection with telephone exchange services. Id. sec. 151, § 271(g), 110 Stat at 91 (to 
be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 271(g». 
60. Id. sec. 151, § 272(a)(2)(B)(iii), 110 Stat at 92 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 272(a)(2)(B)(iii». 
61. Id. sec. 151, § 272(a)(2)(A), 110 Stat at 92 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 272(a)(2)(A». 
62. Id. sec. 151, § 273(h), 110 Stat at 100 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 273(h)). This 
section states that the definition of "manufacturing" is to be the same as in the AT&T 
Consent Decree. 
63. Id. sec. 151, § 273(e)(I), 110 Stat. at 99 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 273 (e)(1»). 
64. Id. sec. 151, § 272(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 92 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(1)). 
65. Id. sec. lSI, § 272(b)(5), 110 Stat. at 93 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(5). 
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With the hope that true competition against BOe's will flourish 
quicldy, the 1996 Act provides for a sunsetting of the separate affiliate 
requirements. Three years after a BOe is authorized to offer long-distance 
services, it will no longer need to either offer long-distance telecommuni-
cations services or conduct manufacturing activities through a separate 
affiliate.66 Using a different starting point, the Act similarly states that four 
years after the date of the 1996 Act (February 8, 2000), a separate affiliate 
will not be needed for the provision of long-distance information ser-
vices.67 The timing of either of the sunset provisions can be extended by 
the FCC if the risk of anticompetitive abuse remains.68 
c. Obtaining an Interconnection Agreement 
Most of the issues surrounding interconnection will be resolved, to a 
large extent, on a case-by-case basis. The final rates, terms, and conditions 
governing a particular interconnection must reflect the legitimate needs of 
all parties. Thus, competitors must reach agreement on a host of sensitive 
issues. There are obvious problems involved in reaching a mutually 
beneficial agreement between business adversaries, especially where one 
party, in effect, holds all the cards.69 The 1996 Act creates a multi-layered 
scheme, whereby interconnecting agreements are reached either through 
negotiation or binding arbitration, and then subject to review by the local 
state commission. 
It will be most cost-efficient if parties resolve their differences through 
voluntary negotiations.'o Both sides have the duty to negotiate "in good 
faith.,,7l This provision requires more cooperation than the analogous 
66. Id. sec. 151, § 272(£)(1), 110 Stat. at 94 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272(f)(1». 
67. Id. sec. 151, § 272(£)(2), 110 Stat. at 94 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272(f)(2». 
68. Id. sec. 151, § 272(£)(1)-(2), 110 Stat. at 94 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272(f)(1)-
(2». 
69. "As distinct from bilateral commercial negotiation, the new entrant comes to the 
table with little or nothing the incumbent LEC needs or wants." Implementation Order, Part 
11,61 Fed. Reg. 45,475, 45,481. As one commentator noted, "I would compare it to going 
to the Department of Motor Vehicles and trying to negotiate more favorable terms there. It 
is very hard to negotiate with somebody who has 100 percent of the market, and a very 
strong desire to keep that situation in place." See PANEL III: ImplicatiOns of the New 
Telecommunications Legislation, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 517, 534 
(1996) (statement of I.Richard Devlin, Executive Vice President, Sprint Corporation). 
70. Telecommunications Act, sec. 101, § 252(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 66 (to be codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 252(a)(I». 
71. Id. sec. 101, § 251(c)(I), 110 Stat. at 62 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C § 251 (c)(I». 
Although this requirement is contained in the subsection entitled "Additional Obligations of 
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers," the section explicitly places the duty to negotiate in 
good faith on both the incumbent and U[t]he requesting telecommunications carrier." Id. See 
also 47 C.F.R. § 51.301(a)-(b) (1996) (DUty to Negotiate). 
264 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49 
requirement under federal labor law. While unions and management are 
required to "confer in good faith," that duty is specifically restricted so as 
not to "compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession."n There is no similar restriction in the 1996 Act. Although 
the Act is not more specific, the very purpose of the Act, to "accelerate 
rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and 
information technologies ... by opening all telecommunications markets to 
competition ... .'>73 implies a more cooperative mindset. While reaching 
an agreement is not required, it would violate the 1996 Act if a party 
"negotiates without serious intent to contract.,,74 
If voluntary agreement is not reached, either side can petition the state 
commission to conduct binding arbitration.7s In setting rates for intercon-
nection or access to unbundled network elements, the state commission is 
not to use the traditional rate-of-return formula. Instead, the rates are to be 
based on actual cost, including a reasonable profit, and must be nondiscrim-
inatory.76 Similarly, rates charged for reciprocal compensation (for 
transport and termination of calls originating on a competitor's network) 
must either reflect the actual costs associated with the transport and 
termination of calls, or be supplanted by a "bill-and-keep" arrangement.77 
The 1996 Act requires that all interconnect agreements, whether 
obtained through voluntary negotiations or binding arbitration, must be 
submitted to the state commission for approva1.78 It is not entirely clear 
why an agreement that was created through arbitration by a state commis-
sion should need to be submitted to the same commission for approval, but 
72. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1971). 
73. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 104-458, at lB. 
74. Robert Summers, 'Good Faith' in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195,221 (1968). SeegenerallyE. ALLAN 
FARNSWOR1H, CONlRAcrs 187-190 (1982). 
75. Telecommunications Act, sec. 101, § 252(b)(I), 110 Stat. at 66 (to be codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 252(b)(l». The demand for arbitration must be filed within a relatively short 
window: between the 135th and 160th day (inclusive) after the incumbent has received a 
request for negotiation. Id. The state commission must reach its arbitration decision within 
nine months from the date of that request for negotiation. Id. sec. 101, § 252(b)(4)(c), 110 
Stat. at 67 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252(b)(4)(c». 
76. Id. sec. 101, § 252(d)(I), 110 Stat. at 67 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252 (d)(I». 
77. Id. sec. 101, § 252(d)(2), 110 Stat. at 68 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2». 
The bill-and-keep arrangement provides that each network will waive its recovery rights in 
exchange for the other network's agreement to do the same. See supra text accompanying 
note 34. 
78. Id. sec. 101, § 252(e)(4), 110 Stat. at 69 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252(e». If 
the state commission dges not act within 90 days of submission of a negotiated agreement, 
or 30 days of an arbitrated agreement, the agreement will be deemed approved. 
Number 2] IDEAS OF THE MARKETPLACE 265 
so be it.79 Negotiated agreements must be approved unless the agreement 
is found to either discriminate against a carrier not party to the agreement 
or be otherwise against the public interest.80 Arbitrated agreements are to 
be approved unless they conflict with the provisions of sections 251 or 
252.81 
There are only two permissible ways to attack the decision, action, or 
inaction of a state commission in this area. First, an aggrieved party can 
petition the FCC to preempt the state commission and take over the 
proceedings.82 Second, a complaint can be filed in federal court to 
determine whether an agreement complies with the Act. 83 State courts are 
denied jurisdiction in this matter. 
States are further limited by section 253, which prempts any local law 
or regulation which creates a barrier to entry into the telecommunications 
market.84 The local government is not entirely out of the regulatory picture 
though. The drafters of the 1996 Act intended that state and local 
governments would retain their ability to "manage the public rights-of-way" 
in a non-discriminatory, competitively-nel;1tral way, and charge "fair and 
reasonable" fees for use of those rights-of-way.85 
This savings clause is likely to be the source of much litigation. Not 
only is the Act silent as to what makes a fee "reasonable," there is also the 
79. While the arbitration procedure, designed to reach a mediated agreement, serves a 
different purpose from the approval procedure, which is designed to ensure that the 
substance of the agreement squares with the procompetitive sections of the Act, it would 
have no doubt been simpler to require the state commission, as arbitrator, to ensure that the 
final agreement be consistent with the Act 
80. Telecommunications Act, sec. 101, § 252(e)(2)(A), 110 Stat at 68 (to be codified 
at 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(2)(A». 
81. ld. sec. 101, § 252{e)(2)(B), 110 Stat at 68 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 252(e)(2)(B». 
82. ld. sec. 101, § 252(e)(5), 110 Stat. at 69 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(5». 
83. ld. sec. 101, §252(e)(6), 110 Stat. at 69 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 252(e)(6». 
84. ld. sec. 101, § 253(a), 110 Stat. at 70 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 253(a». State 
and local governments are also prohibited from regulating Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) 
service, id. sec. 205, § 303(v), 110 Stat. at 114 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303(v», and 
the FCC must regulate to prevent local zoning or other regulation that impairs a viewer's 
ability to receive DBS or MMDS service. ld. sec. 207, 110 Stat. at 114. The new federal 
regulations bar restrictions not only by zoning and building laws, but by private covenants 
and homeowner's associations, unless narrowly tailored to protect interests in safety or 
historic preservation. 47 C.F.R. § 1.4000 (1996). 
85. ld. sec. 101, § 253(c) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 253(c». See also H.R. CONF. 
REp. No. 104-485, at 180 (stating that even though franchising authorities cannot regulate 
cable television operators in their provision of telecommunications services, local 
governments retain their authority over rights-of-way and can charge reasonable fees for 
their use). 
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question as to whether cable operators, who already pay a franchise fee,86 
can be required to pay a second time for the same wire, just because it is 
carrying telecommunications information as well as video programming. 
Moreover, local regulators contend that the power to "manage" rights-of-
way encompasses the power to condition use by telecommunications carriers 
on a variety of regulatory obligations, while those carriers argue that 
management of rights-of-way is limited to safety-type concerns and does 
not include the manner in which the carrier provides service. 
While neither the 1996 Act nor the Conference Report define manage, 
the restricted interpretation is probably more consistent with the intent of 
Congress. First, the section is entitled, "Removal of Barriers to Entry.,,87 
Additionally, the Act specifically permits local governments to protect other 
important interests, such as the rights of consumers and the promotion of 
universal service.88 Such specific permission would not have been needed 
had the authority to manage rights-of-way been all-inclusive. The FCC is 
charged with preempting any local government which oversteps its 
management powers and creates an impermissible barrier to telecommunica-
tion service.89 
D. Universal Service 
The concept of universal service is one of the most important links 
between the old regulatory scheme and the 1996 Act. From the very 
beginnings of the FCC, universal service has been at the center of 
telecommunications policy.90 The 1934 Communications Act, for example, 
mandated that the FCC regulate electronic communications "so as to make 
available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, 
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication 
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges ... .',91 
The 1996 Act represents an attempt to fulfill the commitment to 
universal service while adapting to ongoing changes in both technology and 
the marketplace.92 The 1996 Act includes within its list of universal 
service principles: that rates be '~ust, reasonable and affordable"; that access 
86. See 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (1994). 
87. Telecommunications Act, sec. 101, § 253, 110 Stat. at 70-71 (to be codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 253). 
88. Id sec. 101, § 253(b), 110 Stat. at 70 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 253(b». 
89. Id sec. 101, § 253{d), 110 Stat. at 70-71 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 253(d». 
90. Though as the FCC correctly points out, the costs of universal service are sometimes 
hidden from view: "The current universal service system is a patchwork quilt ofimplicit and 
explicit subsidies." Implementation Order, Part II, 61 Fed Reg. 45,480. 
91. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934) {current version at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994». 
92. See generallyH.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 130-34 (1996). 
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to "advanced telecommunications and information services" be provided to 
consumers living in rural, low-income, or high-cost areas; and that all 
providers of telecommunications services make an "equitable and nondis-
criminatory contribution" to universal service.93 
There are, of course, two preliminary questions for any universal 
service policy: what "services" must be pr-ovided, and how "universal" must 
their provision be? Most importantly, the 1996 Act recognizes that the 
services, which as a matter of national policy, should be available to all 
Americans, can no longer be a static concept. Thus, the Act decrees that 
universal service "is an evolving level of telecommunications services . 
. . . "94 The FCC's definition of universal service is to be established 
"periodically" based on which services have become: essential to education, 
health or safety; deployed and subscribed to by a "substantial majority" of 
residential customers; and otherwise consistent with the public interest.9s 
The actual mechanism for ensuring universal service is to be decided 
by the FCC. All telecommunications carriers that provide interstate service 
must contribute to this mechanism, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory 
basis.96 These contributions will then go to an "eligible telecommunica-
tions carriers"97-those carriers that offer and advertise the components of 
universal service throughout a designated service area.98 Both the scope of 
the designated area and a carrier's status as eligible are determined by each 
state's commission.99 In nonrural areas, the state commissions must 
designate more than one carrier as eligible if mUltiple carriers request the 
designation and meet the statutory requirements. 100 
In addition to receiving monetary contributions, an eligible carrier also 
has the right to demand that incumbent LEC's share their infrastructure in 
order to receive the benefits of the incumbent's economies of scale and 
93. [d. sec. 101, § 254(b), IIO Stat. at 71-72 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(b». 
94. [d. sec. 101, § 254(c), 1I0 Stat. at 72 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(c». 
95. [d. sec. 101, § 254(a)-(d), 110 Stat. at 71-73 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 254( c)(I)(A)-(D». The FCC's action is preceded bytherecommendationofaFederal-State 
Joint Board. [d. sec. 101, § 254(a)(I), 110 Stat. at 71 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 254(a)(I». 
96. [d. sec. 101, § 254(d), 110 Stat. at 73 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(d». 
97. [d. sec. 101, § 254(e), 110 Stat. at 73 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(e». 
98. [d. sec. 102, § 214(e)(I), 110 Stat. at 80 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(l». 
99. [d. sec. 102, § 214(e)(2),(5), 110 Stat. 80 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2), 
(5». 
100. [d. sec. 102, § 214(e)(2), 110 Stat. 80 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2». For 
rural areas, the decision whether to designate more than one carrier as eligible is left to the 
discretion of the state commission. [d. 
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scope. 101 The incumbent must make infrastructure, technology, infonna-
tion and facilities or functions available on 'Just and reasonable tenns" for 
the purpose of providing universal service. 102 
Eligible carriers may only use universal service support for the 
provision, maintenance, and upgrading of facilities and services related to 
the provision of universal service. l03 This is consistent with the general 
requirement that carriers cannot use noncompetitive services to subsidize 
services subject to competition.l04 For interstate services, the FCC must 
establish whatever cost allocation rules and accounting safeguards are 
necessary to ensure that universal services bear no more than a reasonable 
share of the costs of the facilities providing all services. lOS The states have 
the same responsibility for intrastate services. l06 
III. CABLE TELEVISION AND VIDEO PROGRAMMING 
Like the BOCs, cable operators enjoyed a virtual monopoly in their 
service areas prior to the 1996 Act. True, there was the legal right under the 
1992 Cable Television Act for competitors to obtain franchises to lay a 
second cable in an area.107 Also, competition of a limited kind was being 
offered by the newer video distribution systems, such as Direct Broadcast 
Satellites (DBS) and Multi-channel Multipoint Distribution Services 
(MMDS). Nonetheless, cable television still had many of the earmarks, and 
much of the power, of a traditional monopoly. 108 
Cable television faced a dizzying array of changing regulatory 
environments in the twelve years prior to the 1996 Act. In 1984, cable 
operators received a large amount of freedom, for the first time, from rate 
101. lei. sec. 101, § 259(a),(b)(4), 110 Stat. at 77-78 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 259(a),(b)( 4». If an eligible carrier enjoys its own economies of scale and scope, there is 
no right under this provision to share infrastructure. ld. sec. 101, § 259(d), 110 Stat. at 78 
(to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 259(d». 
102. lei. sec. 101, § 259(b)(4), 110 Stat. at 78 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 259(b)(4». 
103. lei. sec. 101, § 254(e), 110 Stat. at 73 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(e». 
104. lei. sec. 101, § 254(k), 110 Stat. at 75 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(k». 
105. lei. 
106. lei. 
107. 47 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(1994). See also Preferred Comm., Inc. v. City of L.A., 754 F.2d 
1396 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding exclusive cable franchises unconstitutional), affd on other 
grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986). 
108. ·'Limited non-cable competition exists today from several non-cable technologies, 
such as DBS, MMDS, and SMATV. Since the total penetration of such alternative providers 
today accounts for less than 10 percent of the country's multichannel video offerings 
however, the competition is a long way from being effective in most areas of the country." 
Botein, supra note 5, at 596-97. 
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and other fonns of regulation.10!) With consumers angry about skyrocket-
ing rates and broadcasters anxious to ensure that their programming would 
be carried on cable systems, Congress overrode a Presidential veto and 
tightened the regulatory reins in 1992.110 
The 1996 Act represents a different balancing act. Cable television is 
to be partly deregulated so it can compete in the broader telecommuni-
cations market. Full deregulation, however, is avoided, because of the 
likelihood of continuing (at least for the immediate future) market 
dominance in the local video arena. Meanwhile, provisions are made to lift, 
once and for all, the legal barriers both to telephone company provision of 
cable and other video programming, and cable entxy into the local telephone 
market. 
A. Effoctive Competition 
The provisions involving the definition of "effective competitiQn" are 
important for many reasons. "Effective competition" is a label desired by 
cable operators seeking rate deregulation as well as the ultimate goal of the 
drafters of the 1996 Act. 
Under the 1992 Cable Act, the tenn "effective competition" was 
limited and rarely found. These standards continue after the 1996 Act, but 
an additional means to detennine "effective competition" was added. 
Under the 1992 Cable Act, cable systems with very low penetration 
rates, under 30 percent of franchise-area households subscribing, are 
deemed to face effective competition. III The vast majority of cable 
operators, those with higher penetration, need to prove that they face direct 
head-to-head competition from a multichannel programmer (such as another 
cable operator, MMDS system, or DBS operator).ll2 To qualify though, 
that competitor needs to offer service to at least half of the cable operator's 
franchise area and provide service to at least 15 percent of the area's 
households.1I3 The last way the 1992 Cable Act provided for a declaration 
of "effective competition" was if the local government itself offered a 
109. See 1984 Cable Act. This was not, by any means, a law which deregulated cable. 
See generally Michael I. Meyerson, The 1984 Cable Communications Policy Act: A 
BalanCing Act on the Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L. REv. 543 (1985). 
110. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
111. 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(I)(A) (1994). 
112. 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1)(C) (1994). 
113. Telecommunications Act of1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 301, 110 Stat. 56, 115 
(to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1)(B». See also Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. 
v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
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comparable service to at least half of the franchise area's households. 114 
The 1996 Act adds a fourth way for a cable operator to claim 
"effective competition," and thus obtain rate deregulation. If a telephone 
company (a "local exchange carrier" in the Act's parlance), offers 
comparable video programming, either directly or through an affiliate, the 
cable operator will be deemed to face effective competition. liS Included 
in this definition are telephone companies who offer video service through 
any means, including MMDS as well as a wire, other than direct-to-home 
satellite, in an unaffiliated c!!ble operator's service area. Unlike the 1992 
Cable Act's provisions regarding other private multi-channel competitors, 
the telephone company need not serve any particular number of video 
subscribers. Instead, the telephone company must simply "offer" service: 
that is be physically able to provide video programming service with only 
a minimal additional investment. 116 
B. Rate Deregulation 
The battle over the extent to which cable rates should be regulated has 
always been the emotional highlight of debates over cable regulation in 
general. 117 The 1996 Act provides greater deregulation immediately, with 
the promise of far greater pricing freedom for cable operators in the years 
to come. 
The 1996 Act continues the distinction, created in the 1992 Cable Act, 
between "basic" service and "cable programming service."u8 The "basic" 
tier of cable programming contains broadcast channels and channels 
offering Public, Educational, and Government (pEG) Access programming. 
"Cable programming service" includes all other tiers of cable programming 
excepting programming offered on a per-channel or per-programming (such 
as pay-per-view) basis. 
The basic tier is subject to local regulation, but that local regulation 
114. Telecommunications Act, sec. 301, 110 Stat. at 115 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 543(1)(1)(C». 
115. Id sec. 301, 110 Stat. at 115 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(1)(1)(D». 
"Comparable" programming means at least 12 channels of programming, at least some of 
which are television broadcast channels. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 170 (1996). 
116. 47 C.F.R. § 76.905( e). Additionally, potential subscribers must be reasonably aware 
that the telephone company's service is available. Id 
117. The 1992 Cable Act, in fact. begins with the finding that cable rates were rising 
three times faster than the rate of inflation since the 1984 Act. See 1992 Cable Act, Pub. L. 
No. 102-385, § 2(a)(I), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460. 
118. See Telecommunications Act, sec. 301, 110 Stat. at 115 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 543(b)(7)(A), (1)(2». 
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must follow strict FCC guidelines.1l9 The FCC's guidelines are extraordi-
narily complicated, even for the telecommunications field, with the 
Commission's implementation order totaling more than 500 pages.120 
Ironically, all the legal and mathematical factors represent nothing more 
than an attempt to define which basic rates are "reasonable.,,121 
Cable operators facing effective competition -are not subject to 
regulation of the basic tier. Additionally, small cable operators who only 
offered basic service as of the end of 1994 are similarly free of basic 
service rate regulation. 122 
For cable operators, the most important change brought by the 1996 
Act is that the other tiers of cable programming, those providing "cable 
programming service," will be free from rate regulation after March 31, 
1999.123 On the belief that there will be true competition for delivering 
"cable-type" programming to consumers after April 1, 1999, governmental 
rate regulation of cable programming service will be no more. Such rate 
regulation is, of course, already ended for those operators facing "effective 
competition," but this deregulation will cover the entire cable industry. 
Until March 31, 1999, for cable operators not facing effective 
competition, rates for these tiers, as with the basic tier, are required to be 
"reasonable." The primary difference is that the setting of these rates is 
done by the FCC, not the local franchising authorities. 124 
While the rate relief reflects a belief in the impending arrival of 
competition, the 1996 Act did not relieve cable operators of many other 
rules that were designed to protect the video marketplace. For example, the 
1992 Cable Act contained strong program access requirements. l25 
Programmers who are vertically integrated with cable operators must sell 
their programs to competing distribution services at reasonable and 
119. It!. sec. 301, no Stat. 56, 116 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543). 
120. Rate Regulation, Report and Order, 8 F.C.C. Red. 5631, 72 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 
733 (1993). 
121. Telecommunications Act, sec. 301, 110 Stat. at 116 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 543(b)(l). 
122. It!. sec. 301, 110 Stat. at 116 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(m)(2». A "small" 
cable operator means one who is not affiliated with either any company serving more than 
1 percent ofthe nation's subscribers or any business with gross annuai revenue greater than 
250 million dollars. See id. 
123. It!. sec. 301, llO Stat. at 115 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(c)(4». 
124. It!. sec. 301,110 Stat. at 116 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(c». It will be harder 
to file a complaint concerning rate increases under the 1996 Act. In a change from the 1992 
Cable Act, only complaints from franchising authorities, rather than by individual subscrib-
ers, will trigger FCC investigation. It!. 
125. It!. sec. 301, 110 Stat. at 117 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 548). The constitution-
ality of this requirement was upheld in Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 
F.Supp. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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nondiscriminatory prices.126 The requirement was not lessened by the 
1996 Act. 127 Similarly, the must-cany rules, which require cable operators 
to cany local broadcast channels, remain substantially unchanged by the 
1996 Act. 128 
C. Ownership of Cable Systems and Other Video Providers 
Other than rates, the other area where the 1996 Act promises to create 
major changes in the cable industry involves the loosening of the rules 
involving cable ownership. Cable television operators are free to enter into 
the larger telecommunications market, but may face stiff competition on 
their home turf from local telephone companies. 
1. Telco Provision of Video Programming 
Ending a lengthy legal battle, the 1996 Act eliminated the ban on 
cable-telephone cross-ownership. Previously, cable television operators and 
local telephone companies were barred from entering the other's field in the 
same location.129 A string of lower federal courts had struck down the 
cross-ownership ban as violative of the First Amendment, and the Supreme 
Court had agreed to hear the issue.130 Before the Court could rule howev-
er, the 1996 Act's removal of the ban was enacted,13I and the Court 
dismissed the challenge as moot. 132 
Under the 1996 Act, there are four ways a local phone company can 
126. Telecommunications Act, sec. 301, 110 Stat. at 117 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§548(c». 
127. In fact, the provision was extended to telephone companies providing video 
programming. Id. sec. 302, 110 Stat. at 121 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 653(b)(I)(a». See 
note 137 and accompanying text, infra. 
128. Telecommunications Act, sec. 301(d)(I)(B), 110 Stat. at 116 (to be codified at 47 
U.S.C. §§ 534-535). The only changes made to the must-carry rules were minor: The FCC 
was permitted to use a variety of measures to determine the market for broadcasters, section 
534(h)(I)(C), and the FCC was forced to rule on petitions to modifY a television market 
within 120 days of a request. See id. 
129. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b), now repealed. There were a few small exceptions, such as for 
cross-ownership in rural areas. See 47 C.F.R. § 63.56(a), now repealed. 
130. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. 
Va. 1993), affd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated, 116 S.Ct. 1036 (1996); U.S. West, 
Inc. v. United States, 855 F.Supp. 1184 (Wash. 1994), aff'd, 48 F.3d 1092, (9th Cir. 1994), 
vacated. 116 S.Ct. 1037 (1996); Pacific Telesis Group v. United States, 48 F.3d 1106 (9th 
Cir. 1994), vacated sub nom. U.S. West, Inc. v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1037 (1996). 
131. Telecommunications Act, sec. 302(b)(l), 110 Stat. at 122 (to be codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 521). 
132. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1036 (1996), 
vacating 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994); U.S. West, Inc. v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1037 
(1996), vacating48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994); Pacific Telesis Group v. United States, 48 
F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 1994). . 
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offer video programming in its local area. A telephone company can 
provide video either as a pure common carrier or a traditional cable 
operator.I33 As a video common carrier, the telephone company is treated 
as a classic common carrier, subject to the common carrier provisions of 
Title II of the Communications Act of 1934. As a traditional cable operator, 
the telephone company would be subject to all of the requirements of the 
1984 and 1992 Cable Acts. 
A third possibility for video distribution is through radio-based 
communication. '34 If a telephone company provides a wireless, radio-
based multichannel video programming distribution service, it will not meet 
Cable Act restrictions. 
The most innovative part of the 1996 Act in this area was the creation 
of a fourth way for telephone company delivery of video programming: the 
"open video system."13S An open video system is a hybrid, of sorts. It 
permits some programming control for the telephone company, but reserves 
other channels for use by nonaffiliated programmers. The drafters of the 
1996 Act hoped that the open video system would become the predominant 
model for telephone entry into the video marketplace.'36 
Specifically, the local telephone company can only select the 
programming for one-third of the open video system's channel capacity, if 
demand for channels exceeds the system's supply. The other two-thirds of 
the system must be made available to nonaffiliated program providers. The 
1996 Act, however, places no upper limit on the number of channels a 
telephone company or its affiliate can program. This provides an incentive 
for the creation of open video systems with large channel capacity. 
As with so much of the 1996 Act, regulation of open video systems 
contain significant antidiscrimination provisions. Most broadly, the operators 
of an open video system may not discriminate in regards to carriage of 
programming, and rates and other conditions of carriage must be just, 
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.137 Moreover, operators of an open 
133. Telecommunications Act, sec. 302(b )(1), § 651, 11 0 Stat. 56, 118-19 (to be codified 
at 47 U.S.C. § 651(a)(2),(3». 
134. Id. sec. 302, § 651, 110 Stat. at 118 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 651(a)(l». 
135. Id. sec. 302, § 653(b)(3), 110 Stat at 124 (to be codified at 47 U:S.C. § 653 (b) (3». 
The FCC's regulations implementing this provision are found at 47 C.F.R. § 76.5100 et. seq. 
The "open video system" concept replaces the former FCC attempt to create a telco-cable 
hybrid, the video dialtone regulations. See id. 
136. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 187 ("[1]he conferees hope that this approach will 
encourage common carriers to deploy open video systems and introduce vigorous 
competition in entertainment and information markets."). 
137. Telecommunications Act, sec. 302, § 653, 110 Stat. at 121 (to be codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 653 (b) (1) (a». 
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video system may not discriminate in favor of their own programming or 
that of their affiliates with regard to infonnation presented to subscrib-
ers.138 Thus, in its advertising or its provision of technical means of 
program selection, the open video systems operator cannot favor its own 
programming over that offered by nonaffiliated entities. 
In keeping with its hybrid nature, an open video system is not to be 
treated, aside from the above requirements, as a common carrier,139 and 
faces only a limited amount of cable-type regulation. There is no need for 
a cable franchise, and neither rate regulation, leased access, cable equip-
ment, nor consumer service rules apply.140 Other Cable Act provisions 
designed to increase the variety of programming choices, such as PEG 
access, must-cany, and program access rules, remain applicable to open 
video systems. 141 
2. Cable Provision of Telephone Service 
The 1996 Act clears away much of the regulatory underbrush which 
kept cable operators from providing local telephone service. Most basically, 
the Act preempts much of the state and local regulations which governed 
the provision of noncable service by cable operators. 
First, franchising authorities are barred from imposing any limit on the 
provision of telephone or telecommunications service by a cable opera-
tor. 142 Second, franchising authorities are barred from requiring that cable 
operators obtain a franchise prior to offering telephone or telecommunica-
tions service.143 Finally, the franchising authority may not use revenue 
from a cable operator's telephone or telecommunications service to calculate 
the franchise fee owed by the operator. 144 
138. Id sec. 302, § 653(b)(l)(e)(i), 110 Stat. at 122-23 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 653(b)(1)( e)(i». 
139. Id sec. 302, § 653(c)(3), 110 Stat. at 124 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 653(c)(3». 
140. Id sec. 302, § 653(c)(I)(C), 110 Stat. at 123 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 653(c)(1)(C». 
141. Id sec. 302, § 653(c)(I)(B)-(C), 110 Stat. at 122 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 653(c)(I)(B)-(C) (stating, inter alia, that Cable Act sections 611 [47 U.S.C. § 531],614 
[47 U.S.C. § 534}, and 628 [47 U.S.C. § 548}, will apply to open video systems). 
142. Id sec. 303, 110 Stat. at 125 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(3)(B». See also 
47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (preempting state and local regulation having the effect of prohibiting 
any entity from providing telecommunications service), discussed in text at note 84, supra. 
Local governments are also prohibited from requiringthat cable operators offer telecommu-
nications services, except for PEG and leased access channels and institutional networks. See 
id 
143. Telecommunications Act, sec. 303, 110 Stat. at 124 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 541(b)(3)(A)(i». 
144. Id, sec. 303, § 622(b), 110 Stat. at 125 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 542(b». 
Under the Cable Act, franchise fees are capped at 5 percent of a cable operator's gross 
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3. Mergers between Cable Operators and Local Telephone 
Companies 
275 
The major restriction on the competitive free-for-all for video 
programming is the continued restriction on mergers and buy-outs between 
cable companies and local telephone companies within their respective 
service areas. This is in keeping with the "two-wire" dream of direct head-
to-head competition between cable and local telephone companies.14s 
The 1996 Act contains parallel prohibitions: a local telephone 
company cannot acquire more than a 10 percent financial interest in a cable 
operator providing service in the telephone company's service area; and a 
cable operator cannot acquire more than a 10 percent financial interest in 
a local telephone company providing service in the cable operator's 
franchise area.146 Not only are direct mergers prohibited, but joint 
ventures between cable operators and telephone companies in the same 
market are also proscribed by the 1996 Act.147 
The joint venture ban is limited, though, to the provision of video 
programming and telecommunications services. A joint venture for other 
purposes, such as constructing the physical facilities for providing the 
programming and services, would be pennitted.148 Similarly, a local 
telephone operator can use a cable system's subscriber drops, the last link 
between the cable operator's network and the individual subscriber.149 
This use requires the approval both of the cable operator, as to rates and 
conditions, and of the FCC, to ensure that this sharing is of limited scope 
and duration. ISO 
revenue.ld. 
145. There is much uncertainty as to how soon it will be economically practicable for 
either the .cable or telephone company to use one wire to carry both cable service and 
telephone service: "[1]t is physically impossible to send a telephone conversation over a 
contemporary unswitched cable system, or to push a full-motion video signal through a 
switched but low-capacity tel co." Botein, supra note 5, at 594. As Professor Botein has 
noted, although both cable systems and LECs send electronic signals through wires. "the 
resemblance between the two technologies just about ends there; for the foreseeable future, 
the two distribution systems are· about as similar as an electric utility and a gas pipeline." ld. 
at 569. 
146. Telecommunications Act, sec. 302, § 652(a)-(b), 110 Stat. at 125 (to be codified at 
47 U.S.C. § 652(a)-(b». 
147. ld. sec. 302, § 652(c), 110 Stat at 119-20 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 652(c». 
148. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 174. 
149. ld. 
150. There were some narrow exceptions made to the ban on cable/telco merger. 
Telephone companies can combine with co-located cable operators in rural areas. 
Telecommunications Act, sec. 302, § 652(d)(I), 110 Stat. at 119 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 652(d)(I». Underthisprovision, the combined-entity must serve a location with fewer than 
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The FCC was also given authority to issue waivers, pennitting 
cable/telco combinations. lSI Prior to issuing such a waiver, the FCC must 
detennine either that the cable or telephone company faces economic 
distress; the cable system or telephone facilities would not be economically 
viable; or the public interest clearly outweighs the anticompetitive effects 
of the combination. ls2 Additionally, the local franchising authority must 
approve such waiver before it becomes effective. 153 
4. Other Cable Ownership Issues 
While the drafters of the 1996 Act maintained numerous provisions to 
limit co-ownership of cable and telco systems, a deregulatory mindset 
pervaded other cable ownership issue. In an effort to strengthen cable as a 
player in the new competitive marketplace, many previous restrictions on 
cable sale and ownership were lifted. 
Under the fonner Cable Act provisions, "trafficking" in cable systems 
was limited. Cable operators were barred from selling a cable system for 
three years after acquisition or initial construction. ls4 That three-year 
holding period has now been eliminated. ISS As under the old law, fran-
chising authorities are given 120 days to decide whether to approve a 
request for approval of a transfer of system ownership, with the transfer 
35,000 inhabitants outside an urbanized area, and must serve no more than 10 percent of the 
households in the telephone company's service area. 
There were also some provisions that were written to apply to only a tiny number of 
situations. For example, under one exception, merger is permitted if the cable system either: 
1) is not owned by one of the 50 largest cable operators, is outside the top 100 television 
markets, and serves no more than 17,000 subscribers, with at least 8000 urban and 6000 non-
urban; or 2) serves fewer than 20,000 subscribers, of whom at most 12,000 live in urban 
areas, and is combining with a small telephone company, one with less than $100 million 
in annual revenue. Id sec. 302, § 652{d)(4)-(5), 110 Stat. at 121 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 652(d)(4)-(5». 
A special exception was also carved out for some of the extremely few areas where a 
competitive cable market existed prior to the 1996 Act. Under this provision, in all but the 
top 25 largest television markets, a telephone company will be able to merge with a local 
cable operator, as long as: 1) It is not the largest cable operator in the area; 2) The acquired 
cable system is not owned by one of the 50 largest MSOs; 3) The area's larger cable system 
is owned by one of 1 0 largest MSOs; and 4) The acquired cable system must have obtained 
a franchise covering the same area as the largest system as of May 1, 1995. Id sec. 302, 
§ 652(d)(3), llO Stat. at 121 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 652(d)(3». 
151. Id sec. 302, § 652(d)(6), llO Stat. at 120 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 652(d)(6». 
152. Id sec. 302, § 652(d)(6)(A), 110 Stat. at 121 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 652(d)(6)(A». 
153. Id 
154. 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (1994) (repealed 1996). 
155. Telecommunications Act, sec. 301(i), 110 Stat. at 117 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 537». 
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treated as granted if no decision is rendered within that time. 156 
Similarly, restrictions on cable operator co-ownership of other fonns 
of electronic communication were also eased. First, the FCC was instructed 
to eliminate its restriction on cable operator ownership of a broadcast 
network. IS7 To prevent anticompetitive abuse by such co-ownership, the 
FCC was also instructed to ensure carriage, channel positioning and 
nondiscriminatory treatment of nonaffiliated broadcasters by the ca-
ble/network combination. ISS 
The 1996 Act is not quite so bold with the issue of cable cross-
ownership of broadcast stations in the same market. While the 1996 Act 
removes the statutory ban on such combinations,ls9 the FCC is left to 
detennine the ultimate question as to their pennissibility. In fact, the 
drafters of the 1996 Act specified that they did not intend, by their statutory 
repeal, to indicate one way or the other whether the FCC should change its 
existing cross-ownership ban. 160 
Finally, the ban on cable ownership of either colocated SMA1V 
systems or colocated MMDS systems is eased. Cable ownership of either 
of these two video delivery systems will now be pennitted in any area 
where a cable operator is subject to effective competition.161 
IV. BROADCASTERS IN THE NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
MARKETPLACE 
The lowest-tech players in the telecommunications revolution, the 
broadcasters, received significant regulatory relief from the 1996 Act. In 
addition to the changes in the rules governing cable ownership of stations 
and networks,162 broadcasters also benefited from the deregulatory 
tradewinds. Ironically, though, most of the changes affecting broadcasters 
actually serve to limit intramedia competition. 
For example, in deciding whether to renew a broadcast license, the 
FCC is now barred from considering the proposal of any alternate potential 
15'6. fd. sec. 301, 110 Stat. at 117 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 537). 
157. Id. sec. 202(f)(1), 110 Stat. at III (revising 47 C.F.R. § 76.501). 
158. Id. sec.202(f)(2), 1I0 Stat. at 111. 
159. Id. sec. 202(i), 110 Stat. at 112 (eliminating 47 U.S.C. § 533 (a) (1». 
160. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 164 (discussing FCC review of 47 C.F.R. 
§ 76.501). 
161. Telecommunications Act, sec. 202(i)(6), 110 Stat. at 112 (adding 47 U.S.C. 
§ 533(a)(3». For a discussionof"effective competition," see text accompanying notes 111-
16, supra. 
162. See text accompanying supra notes 154-61. 
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broadcaster. 163 Instead, the FCC must only consider whether the broad-
caster has committed "serious" violations of FCC rules and has served the 
public interest.164 
Not only is renewal easier, 165 the terms of the license have been 
increased. Instead of a five-year license for television and seven-year for 
radio, all broadcasters will now enjoy an eight-year license period.166 
Many of the limits on multiple ownership of broadcast licenses have 
been eased or eliminated. On a national level, the limit on the number of 
AM or FM radio stations which can be controlled by one entity was 
eliminated.167 The national limit on the number of television stations was 
also removed,168 and now the only remaining national ceiling is that one 
entity cannot own television stations which, together, reach more than 35 
percent of the nation's television households.169 
The rules governing mUltiple-ownership within a particular local 
market have been relaxed, though not eliminated. For radio, a complicated 
matrix was created, with the number of permissible co-owned stations 
dependant both on the number of available commercial radio stations and 
whether the stations are concentrated in the same "service," either the AM 
or FM band:170 
163. Telecommunications Act, sec. 204, § 309(k), 110 Stat. at 115 (to be codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 309(k)(4». In fact, this subsection is entitled, "Competitor Consideration 
Prohibited." Id 
164. Id sec. 204, § 309(k)(l), 110 Stat. at 112 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §309(k)(1». 
165. In practice, though, broadcast renewal has always been a virtual sure-thing. See, e.g., 
Monroe Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 900 F.2d 351, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Silberman, J., 
concurring) ("Quite obviously the FCC shrinks from the prospect of taking the license away 
from the incumbent, but •.. it is hard to see how the FCC canjustiiY the weight it places 
on incumbency in [the renewal] case."). 
166. Telecommunications Act, sec. 203, § 307(c), 110 Stat. at 112 (to be codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 307(c)(I». 
167. Id sec.202(a), 110 Stat. at 110 (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555). 
168. Id sec.202(c)(I)(A), 110 Stat. at (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555). 
169. Id sec. 202(c)(l)(B), 110 Stat. at (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.35555). This is 
an increase from the previous national cap of 25 percent. See 47 C.F.R. §73.3555 (1995) 
(now revised). 
170. Telecommunications Act, sec. 202(b), 110 Stat. at 110 (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. 
§ 73.3555). 
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Number of Commercial Maximum Number of All Maximum Number of 
Stations in a Market Stations in That Market Same-Service Stations 
45 or more 8 5 
.30 - 44 7 4 
15 - 29 6 4 
14 or fewer 5 3 
Congress was not willing to make a final decision as to local 
ownership limits for television stations. Instead, the 1996 Act directs the 
FCC to "conduct a rulemaking proceeding to determine whether to retain, 
modify or eliminate" the current ban on owning more than one station in 
a market (the so-called "duopoly rule',).171 While not expressing any 
position on this issue directly, Congress did state in the Conference Report 
that if the duopoly rules were revised, VHF-VHF combinations should only 
be allowed in "compelling circumstances."172 
Congress also liberalized the rules as to television/radio co-ownership. 
Prior to the Act, the FCC permitted common ownership of a radio and a 
television station in the same market only if thirty broadcast owners were 
operating in that market, and the market was in any of the top twenty-five 
largest.173 The 1996 Act extends that policy to include any of the top fifty 
markets. 174 
The 1996 Act also provides a little more flexibility than in the past for 
broadcast television networks to combine. Previously, all television 
networks were barred from common-ownership.175 The "Big-4" networks 
(ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox) are still barred from merging either with each 
other or the fledgling WB and UPN networks. Mergers are permitted, 
though, between either the WB and UPN networks, or between any existing 
network and some new network formed after the Act. 176 
Perhaps the strangest part of the 1996 Act, involves "Advanced 
Television Services" (ATV), the allocation of the spectrum which will be 
171. Id. sec. 202(c)(2), 110 Stat. at 111 (referring to current duopoly rule at 47 C.P.R. 
§ 73.3555). 
172. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 163. 
173. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1995) (now revised). 
174. Telecommunications Act, sec. 202(d), IlO Stat. at 11 1. 
175. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(g) (now revised). 
176. Telecommunications Act, sec 202(c), 110 Stat. at 111. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(g) 
(as revised). 
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used for digital, high definition television.I71 Whomever gets awarded this 
portion of the spectrum stands to enjoy an enormous windfall, in large 
measure due to the variety of services that will be able to be transmitted 
simultaneously by the license holder. 
The early winners in this legislative slugfest were the existing 
broadcasters. The 1996 Act states that if PJ:V licenses are issued, they are 
to be awarded to only those who are already licensed broadcasters. 178 
But even that requirement in the Act did not end the dispute. Shortly 
before Congress completed its work on the Act, political opposition to this 
"governmental give-away" began to build. In order to prevent the issue 
from scuttling the rest of the Act, and to avoid a painful rewriting process, 
Congressional leaders secured a promise from the FCC that the Commission 
would not issue PJ:V licenses until Congress held further hearings and had 
the opportunity to revise the plan laid out in the 1996 Act.179 Thus, the 
actual control over PJ:V is still not determined, and it has yet to be seen 
whether the broadcasters of the twentieth century are permitted to become 
the high-tech HDTV station owners of the future. 
V. DIRECT REGULATION OF CONTENT OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
There is an almost Holmesian feel to much of the 1996 Act, an 
underlying conviction that the creation of multiple carriers of information 
will benefit society by multiplying the number of voices in the marketplace 
of ideas. I80 Or, as Judge Learned Hand saw it, "right conclusions are 
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any 
kind of authoritative selection."181 The 1996 Act, accordingly, focuses 
largely on creating competition between carriers of information, and trusts 
to the market to determine the content which is carried. 
All freedoms, though, are capable of abuse.182 In particular, not only 
was the marketplace for violent and sexually oriented programming getting 
177. Telecommunications Act, sec 201, § 336(g), 110 Stat. at 110 (to be codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 335(g)). 
178. Id. sec. 201, § 336(a)(l), 110 Stat. at 107 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 335(a)(I)). 
179. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Blake & Ellen P. Goodman, Second Byte: Congressional 
Excursion into Digital TV, 14 COMM. LAW. at 3-5 (1996). 
180. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 6 I 6, 630 (19 I 9) (Holmes, J. dissenting) 
("[T]he best test of truth is the power ofthe thought to get itselfaccepted in the competition 
of the market ••.. "). 
181. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N. Y. 1943), aff d, 326 U.S. 
1 (1944). 
182. "Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything; and in no 
instance is this more true than that of the press." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 271 (196) (quoting James Madison in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON TIlE FEDERAL 
CONSTITIITION 571 (1876). 
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larger, but Congress feared that too many children were wandering through 
its stalls. Accordingly, in contradistinction to the content-neutrality of the 
rest of the 1996 Act, several provisions dealing directly with such 
programming were included, under the appellation "Communications 
Decency Act of 1996."183 
A. Broadcast Violence and Indecency 
For broadcast television, Congress's primary interest was to create a 
technological barrier to objectionable programming, but leave control over 
that barrier in the hands of individual parents. The easier part of that task 
was the mandating of the technological barrier. First, all video programming 
that has been rated must be transmitted with its rating. l84 Second, all 
television sets sold in the United States will contain a so-called "V-Chip" 
that will block out all programming which has been rated unsuitable for 
children due to its sexual or violent content.18S The FCC is charged with 
choosing the starting date for this requirement, as long as that date is after 
February 8, 1998, two years after enactment of the 1996 ACt.186 
The tricky part of the plan, however, is to design a rating system that 
does not violate the First Amendment. Any system in which the Govern-
ment is choosing what programs to bar is, of course, fraught with 
constitutional peril.187 The 1996 Act contains the threat that the FCC will 
create its own ratings guidelines.18s The only way to avoid a government-
ally created rating system is if the broadcasters, along with cable television 
operators, follow the model of the film industry,189 and do the rating 
themselves. 190 
183. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.1 04-104, sec. 501, 110 Stat. 56, 133. 
184. ld. sec. 551(b), § 303(w)(2), 110 Stat at 140 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 303(w)(2». 
185. ld. sec. 551(c), § 303(x), 110 Stat at 141 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303 (x». 
Actually, this only applies to television sets with a diagonal screen of 13 inches or greater. 
ld. 
186. ld. sec. 551(e)(2), 110 Stat at 142. 
187. See, e.g., Freedman v. Md, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Interstate Circuit v. Dallas. 390 
U.S. 676 (1968). 
188. Te1communications Act, sec. 551(b), § 303(w)(I), 110 Stat at 140 (to be codified 
at 47 U.S.C. § 303(w)(I»; id. sec. 551(e)(2), 110 Stat at 142. These guidelines, which are 
to be promulgated after an advisory board issues recommendations, are not intended to be 
formal "requirements," that broadcasters must use. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 104-458, at 195. 
However, if any rating system is used, the rating must be transmitted with the programming. 
ld. sec. 551(b), § 303(w)(2), 110 Stat at 140 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303(w)(2». 
189. See generally Douglas Ayer et al., Self-Censorship in the Movie Industry: An 
Historical Perspective of Law and Social Change, 1970 WIse. L. REv. 791 (1970). 
190. Telecommunications Act, sec. 551(e)(I), 110 Stat at 142. The broadcast industry, 
in part due to their desire to please the same congressional powers that would be distributing 
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There are several possible side-effects from the V-Chip proposal that 
may prevent it from achieving its goal. First, since the 1996 Act requires 
that the ratings identify "programming that contains sexual, violent, or other 
indecent material about which parents should be informed,"!9! it is 
possible that much prime time television programming will be "identified." 
If that happens, parents will be forced to choose between having almost all 
broadcasting blocked in the evenings, or letting all of the material, 
appropriate and inappropriate, into their homes. Secondly, the FCC's current 
ban on indecent broadcasting was upheld by the Court because "broadcast-
ing is uniquely accessible to children," since offensive broadcasts could not 
"be withheld from the young without restricting the expression at its 
source.,,!92 Once the V-Chip is in place, though, such selective withhold-
ing of offensive material will be possible, and the prime rationale for 
distinguishing broadcast indecency from bookstores and movie theaters will 
be gone. The unintended result of the V-Chip proposal, then, would be that 
broadcasters would show far more sexually explicit, indecent, and violent 
programming, contending that children were now to be protected by 
technology. 193 
B. Cable Indecency 
Cable television, in a sense, may present a picture of what the future 
of broadcasting looks like. Lock-boxes and similar devices to block out 
particular, unwanted programming, have not only been available, but, since 
1984, cable operators have been required to offer them to subscribers.!94 
Accordingly, courts have uniformly found bans on cable indecency to be 
unconstitutional. 195 
Nonetheless (or perhaps, predictably), complaints over the explicitness 
of cable programming have continued. Both the 1992 Cable Act and the 
the lucrative spectrum for Advanced Television, see text accompanying supranotes 177-79, 
announced their willingness to establish "voluntary" rules for rating programming. 
191. ld. sec. 5S1(e)(I), 110 Stat. at 142 (emphasis added). 
192. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). 
193. This is what occurred in the diaI-a-pom case, where a ban on telephone indecency 
was struck down due to the availability of "less restrictive means" for protecting children. 
Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. I IS, 129 (1989). 
194. 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2) (1994). 
195. See, e.g., Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420-21 (11th Cir. 1985); Community 
Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 61 I F.Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985), affdsub nom. Wilkinson 
v. Jones, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), affd without opinion, 480 U.S. 926 (1987). 
Obscenity, which is not constitutionally protected, can be banned from cable television, and 
the 1996 Act raised the penalty for transmitting obscene cable programming from $10,000 
to $100,000. Telecommunications Act, sec. 503, 110 Stat. at 136 (amending 47 U.S.C. 
§ 559). 
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1996 Telecommunications Act contain numerous provisions attempting to 
deal with the issue, but much of the legislative plan became entangled in 
constitutional challenges. 
The 1996 Act, for example, required the scrambling of any "sexually 
explicit adult programming," or indecent programming on a channel 
"primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming.,,196 Prior to 
scrambling the signal, the program could not be shown during any time of 
day, "when a significant number of children are likely to view it.,,197 
Almost immediately upon enactment, this provision was found to be 
constitutionaIIy suspect. Again, it was held that lock boxes were less-
restrictive alternatives, which would adequately protect parents. 198 
A more modest, content-neutral scrambling requirement imposed by 
the 1996 Act has not been challenged. This section requires the scrambling, 
at no cost, of any channel at the request of a cable subscriber.199 An 
earlier Senate version of this provision had included the additional standard 
that the programming to be scrambled be, in the judgement of the 
subscriber, "unsuitable for children," but this was dropped from the final 
bill.200 
Another area of interest to legislators has been programming offered 
on leased and public access channels. These channels are programmed by 
those not affiliated with the cable operator, and traditionally have been 
carried free from operator censorship.201 Both the 1992 Cable Act and the 
1996 Telecommunications Act contain provisions permitting cable operators 
to refuse to cany offensive programming on these channels.202 In a split 
decision, of sorts, the Supreme Court ruled that the 1992 provisions on 
leased access were constitutional, but that the public access provision 
196. Telcommunications Act, sec. 505, § 641(a), 110 Stat. at 136 (to be codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 641(a». "Scramble" is defined to mean rearranging the content of the signal sent 
into the home so that the programming cannot be seen or heard in an understandable manner. 
Id. sec. 505, § 641(c), 110 Stat. at 136 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 641(c». 
197. Id. sec. 505, § 641(b), 110 Stat. at 136 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 641(b». The 
FCC ruled that unscrambled adult programming could only be shown between the hours of 
10 p.m. and 6 a.m. 
198. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States. 918 F. Supp. 813 (D. Del. 
1996). 
199. Telecommunications Act, sec. 504, § 640(a), 110 Stat. at 136 (to be codifed at 47 
U.S.C. § 640(a». 
200. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 192. 
201. 47 U.S.C. §§ 531, 532 (l994). 
202. The 1992 Cable Act permitted operators to refuse to carry access programming that 
depicted "sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner," Section 
lO(a) and lO(c). The 1996 Telecommunications Act permitted operators to refuse to carry 
access programming, "which contains obscenity, indecency or nudity." Telecommunications 
Act, sec. 506, 110 Stat. at 136-37 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 531(e), 532(c)(2». 
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violated the First Amendment.203 The primary differences between the two 
provisions, according to a plurality of the Court, was that public access was 
imposed and regulated by franchising authorities, and not the Federal 
Government, and that there was no record of a nationwide problem with 
"patently offensive" public access programming.204 Granting cable 
operators the power to bar public access programming would "greatly 
increase the risk that certain categories of programming (say borderline 
offensive programs) will not appear.,,20S 
Although the 1996 Act's provisions were not at issue in this case, it 
seems likely that only the leased access provisions will be enforceable. One 
court has suggested that the 1996 Act provision permitting operators to bar 
"obscene" public access programming would be constitutional, since such 
programming is unprotected by the First Amendment.206 The same reasons 
that led to the 1992 public access provisions being held unconstitution-
al-the role of local franchising authorities, the lack of a record of national 
problems with public access, and the risk that "borderline" public access 
programming will be barred-apply with equal force to the 1996 public 
access provisions. 
One area of potential difficulty arises because the 1992 Act imposed 
liability on cable operators for carrying obscene public and leased access 
programming.207 It is, however, unconstitutional to impose liability for 
programming that one is mandated to carry.20S Unless the cable operator 
is relieved of all liability for public access programming, control of such 
programming, with the attendant risk that certain programming ''will not 
appear," will need to be returned to the operator. 
C. Internet Indecency 
The 1996 Act does not deal in great detail with the Internet,209 
Generally, the philosophy seems to be that the highly populated world of 
203. Denver Area Educational Tele-Comm. Consortium,Jnc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 
(1996). The Court also struck down a 1992 provision requiring cable operators to segregate 
"patently offensive" leased access programming on a single channel and only permit 
subscriber access upon written request. 1992 Cable Act, Section 10(b). 
204. Denver Educational, 116 S.Ct. 2374, 2394-97. This part of Justice Breyer's opinion 
was joined by only Justices Stevens and Souter. 
205. [d. at 2397. 
206. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 981 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
207. 47 U.S.C. § 558 (1994). This provision was upheld in Time Warner,93 F.3d 957. 
208. See Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 535 (1959). 
209. For a general description of the Internet, see Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 925 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (describing the Internet as, "a collection of more than 50,000 networks 
linking some nine million host computers in ninety countries •.•. "). 
Number 2] IDEAS OF THE MARKETPLACE 285 
networks, web pages and on-line services was sufficiently competitive 
without federal intervention. The major area where Congress did attempt to 
regulate computer services involv~d the presentation of indecent material 
which could be accessed by minors. 
In addition to several noncontroversial provisions,2lo the 1996 Act 
criminalized the use of interactive computer services to display "patently 
offensive" sexually explicit material so that it was "available" to mi-
nors.211 This provision was held unconstitutional by two different three-
judge COUrts.212 Each court found that there was no practical way, under 
current technology, for most providers of on-line information, to control 
whd receives their communication. As Judge Sloviter wrote: "[I]t is either 
technologically impossible or economically prohibitive for many of the 
plaintiffs to comply with the [Act] without seriously impeding their posting 
of online material which adults have a constitutional right to access.,,213 
A perhaps more successful approach will be the encouragement of 
nongovernmental players to police the Internet The 1996 Act protects what 
it terms "good samaritan" blocking of certain programming.214 This 
section states that those who run interactive computer services may not "be 
held liable" if they voluntarily restrict access to material they consider, in 
good faith, to be "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
barassing or otherwise objectionable.,,2Is 
210. For example, the 1996 Act makes it a crime to use telecommunication devices to 
induce a minor to engage in any illegal sexual act, Telecommunications Act, sec. 508, 110 
Stat. at 137 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b», or to annoy or harass another person 
either with obscene and indecent communication or by repeated telephone calls. Id. sec. 502, 
§ 223(a)(I)(B), (D)-(E), 110 Stat. at 133 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(l)(B), (D)-
(E». The Act also clarifies that it is a felony to use a computer to transmit obscene material. 
Id. 110 Stat. at 137 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1462). This last amendment probably does 
not change pre-existing obscenity law, which was generally interpreted to reach that result. 
See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701,704-05 (6th Cir. 1995) (affirming obscenity 
convictions for the operation of a computer bulletin board). 
211. Telecommunications Act, sec. 502, § 223(d), 110 Stat. at 133 (to be codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 223(d». 
212. Shea, 930 F. Supp. 916; ACLU v Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The 
Supreme Court has agreed to review the ruling in ACLU v. Reno, 65 U.S.L. W. 3411 (1996). 
213. ACLU v Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 853. 
214. Telecommunications Act, sec. 509, § 230(c), 110 Stat. at 138 (to be codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 230 (c». 
215. Id. sec. 509, § 230(c)(2), 110 Stat. at 138 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2». 
The 1996 Act also protects those who provide connections to the Internet or networks they 
do not control, are not responsible for on-line content. Id. sec. 502, § 223(e), 110 Stat. at 
134 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(e». This protection is reserved for "entities that 
simply offer general access to the Internet and other online content." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 
104-458, at 190. 
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The stated purpose of this provision is "to overrule,,216 the decision 
of the New York trial court in Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy.217 The issue 
in that case was whether, Prodigy, an on-line computer service which 
operated numerous "forums" for subscriber's to use to share information, 
should .be viewed as a "publisher" responsible for defamatory comments on 
its forums, or a "conduit" with minimal liability. Because Prodigy had 
declared itself to be "family oriented" and used both software and personnel 
to police the forums for inappropriate language and topics, the court held 
that Prodigy would bear legal responsibility, just like a traditional 
newspaper publisher.218 This theory would force on-line service providers 
into choosing between foregoing all control of their service or engaging in 
the task of reviewing, and censoring, thousands of postings daily.219 
The 1996 Act attempts to give service providers a middle ground. 
They will not be held responsible for content they do not 'produce simply, 
"because they have restricted access to objectionable material."220 Thus, 
a service provider need not adopt a totally hands-off policy to escape 
liability for bulletin board comments.221 
While this should give some comfort to service providers who want 
to offer a "family" service, the protection given by the 1996 Act is not 
complete. If a service provider bars a message for a reason other than those 
listed in the Act, it presumably would be treated as a publisher of all the 
messages it posts. 
A Prodigy spokesperson had stated, ''What we do with our bulletin 
boards is identical to the policy taken by most newspapers on letters to the 
editor. No obscenity, no slander, no libel, no commerciaIism.,,222 It is not 
at all clear that this policy is covered by the good samaritan provision. 
Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the phrase "otherwise objection-
able," probably will not be interpreted so broadly as to cover anything to 
which a service provider like Prodigy might object.223 Ironically, then, an 
216. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 
217. 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1995). 
218. Id 
219. See generally Michael 1. Meyerson, Authors, Editors, and Uncommon Carriers: 
Identifying the 'Speaker' Within the New Media, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 79, II 6-124 
(1995). 
220. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 104-458, at 194. 
221. Cj. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(holding that CompuServe was not responsible because it had "little or no editorial control" 
over the content of the postings.). 
222. Felicity Barringer, Electronic Bulletin Boards Need Editing. No They Don't, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 11, 1990 at Section 4, p.4 quoting Brian Ek, spokesperson for Prodigy. 
223. This doctrine states that "where general words follow an enumeration ..• by words 
of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed to their 
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on-line service provider who removes some defamatory material, may well 
end up responsible for any defamatory material that remains, while a similar 
provider who permits all the material to be posted would escape liability. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act has forever transformed the 
regulatory landscape.224 The Act itself is complex; simultaneously detailed 
and incomplet~. The thousands of pages of FCC rulemaking only increase 
the difficulty of comprehending the enormous changes brought 'about by the 
Act. 
Nonetheless, there are basic themes that permeate the Act. The Act 
contemplates the creation of competition across the full telecommunications 
field, even in areas such as local telephone service and cable television 
service that had previously been monopoly controIled.225 The main 
combatants in this new marketplace will tend to be even larger companies 
than those currently dominating the scene. One can well "envision a future 
of titanic telecommunications and titanic telecommunicators, a competitive 
field dominated by highly capitalized, deep-pocket giants.,,226 
The hope is that this new marketplace will create not only the 
advantages of competition but the unforeseeable benefits which result from 
a new synergetic relationship between previously separated businesses and 
technologies: "The opening of all telecommunications markets to all 
providers will blur traditional industry distinctions and bring new packages 
of services, lower prices and increased innovation to American consum-
ers.,,227 
There are numerous dangers, however, that will have to be averted in 
order for the Act to be successful. The first is that existing monopolies, 
such as the BOCs or cable operators, will leverage their current power 
either to gain an unfair advantage in a competitive market, or to retain their 
advantage in the local arena. 228 
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general 
kind or class as those specifically mentioned." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (6th ed. 
1990). 
224. "From this point forward, telecommunications law starts with the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996." Jim Chen, Antitrust Issues in the Telecommunications and Software 
Industries: Titanic Telecommunications, 25 Sw. U.L. REv. 535, 537 (1996). 
225. See text accompanying supra notes 8-16. 
226. Chen, supra note 224, at 545. See also id. at 551 (stating that in the local telephone 
market, "we should expect only one type of entrant: big."). 
227. Implementation Order, Part II, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,475, 45,480 (1996). 
228. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 14, at 522 (stating "There is no question that the risk 
of cross-subsidy is highest when the regulated monopolies enter an adjacent market with high 
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The second danger is that the cure to the first is worse than the 
disease. The primary strategy for creating new competition is that the Act 
permits, indeed encourages, smaller players, "to combine, collude, and 
combat" the entrenched monopoIies.229 Accordingly, there is a lessening 
of intramedia competition (such as the ability for one entity to control more 
broadcast stations), in the hope of creating intermedia competition. 
Additionally, certain cross~media combinations (such as between cable 
operators and broadcast networks, or between long~distance and local 
telephone providers) are permitted in the hope of improving the chances of 
"intermodal" competition.230 
If these new combinations do not compete with one another, then the 
Act may have only permitted the creation of large, deregulated monopolists 
(or oIigopoIists). The FCC, local regulators, and Congress must watch 
carefully the unfolding of the new telecommunications field so that we may 
see these large entities truly battling each other for the hearts and wallets 
of consumers.231 
Even ifthere is such competition, the FCC will have one more critical 
task: the need to ensure that there is a place for the smaller player. Be it in 
reselling of local phone service, or a programmer seeking one channel on 
a cable or Open Video System, there must always be some way for new 
entry into the telecommunications field. 
Finally, amidst all the wiring and rewiring, merging and affiliating, 
one thought should be kept in mind. At the end of the day, what will be 
most important for the American citizen is not the quantity of fiber optics, 
coaxial cable or microwave antennae that line our streets, but the quality of 
the information that enters our businesses and homes. 
joint costs."). But see Chen, supra note 224, at 552 (stating local telephone service is "a 
contestable, albeit imperfectly competitive market •••. "). 
229. Chen, supra note 224, at 558. 
230. Id. at 551. 
231. See, e.g., Botein, supra note 5, at 597 (stating that "both the telco and cable 
industries may end up with three or four dominant players ~ which in tum may merge or 
form strategic alliances with each other"); Chen, supra note 224, at 557 (referring to "the 
possibility of pro competitive combinations"). 
